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Multilevel Judicial Governance as
Guardian of the Constitutional Unity of
International Economic Law
PROF. DR. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN*

In terms of rules, principles, state-centered treaty regimes,
legislative authorities, executive and judicial institutions, and
communities of citizens, the international legal system continues to
be fragmented and anarchic. This is illustrated by the widespread
national and international governance failures to more effectively
protect human rights under the rule of international law and
prevent the unnecessary poverty of more than one billion people
living on less than one dollar per day.' From the normative point of
view of the universal recognition of human rights by all 192 UN
member states, however, modern international law has become,
arguably, constitutionally founded on "inalienable" human rights
deriving from respect for human dignity.2 This includes erga omnes
obligations binding all national and international governance
institutions with a progressively expanding jus cogens core.' In a
globally interdependent world, these universal human rights
obligations require judicial protection of the rule of law in human
Petersmann is a Professor of International and European Law at the
European
University Institute (EUI) and Head of its Law Department, Florence, Italy. Former
professor at the University of Geneva and its Graduate Institute of International Studies;
former legal advisor in the German Ministry of Economic Affairs, GATT and the WTO,
and member or chairman of several GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels.
1. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report
2007/2008 25 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008_en_
complete.pdf.
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
3. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic
Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights Constitution, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 29-67 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds.,

2006) [hereinafter
international law).
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human rights in modern
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interactions beyond states, for example, in the worldwide division
of labor and the collective protection of security.'
International economic law promotes the emergence of
regional communities. Notably, in Europe these regional
communities insist on democratic re-interpretation of the
"international law among states" as empowering and protecting
citizens and their democratic self-governance.' This "democratic
paradigm" of a citizen-oriented international law system, as
reflected already in the human rights commitments of the UN
Charter,6 is promoted by the multilevel governance structures of
more than two hundred and fifty regional trade agreements. This is
especially true when such agreements combine guarantees of
economic freedoms with human rights commitments and judicial
remedies, empowering citizens vis-A-vis welfare-reducing
government restrictions.7 Yet, "democratic constitutionalization"
of economic integration law remains contested, as seen in the
recent cases of judicial review by European courts of whether UN
Security Council sanctions are consistent with human rights.8
International law, like municipal law, regulates human behavior in
incomplete ways by using indeterminate legal terms, whose
normative premises and precise meaning remain controversial
4.

See generally JACK

L. GOLDSMITH &

ERIC A.

POSNER, THE LIMITS OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2005). The compatibility of constitutional
democracy with rule of international law is contested not only by state-centered "realist
approaches" criticizing the "democratic deficit" of international law, but also rights-based
or communitarian "constitutional interpretations" of international law. These approaches
may require cosmopolitan and democratic re-interpretations of intergovernmental rules
that are bound to be contested by international lawyers focusing on power-oriented
conceptions of international law among states. Constitutionalism offers the most coherent
framework for rendering constitutional democracy compatible with rule of international
law as an indispensable instrument for collective supply of international public goods
which individual states cannot secure unilaterally.
5. ConstitutionalFunctions,supra note 3, at 32.
6. Id. at 29.
7. STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION § 1.1 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-

Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006) (discussing two competing visions regarding trade
governance).
8. See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3649; Case T306/01, Yusuf v. Council & Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533; Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council
& Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-52. The EC Court of First Instance considered aspects of the
right to property. It determined the right to a fair hearing and the right to a judicial
remedy were protected by jus cogens rules. The court also considered arbitrary
interferences with rights to respect for private and family life and the right to a reputation
as contrary to jus cogens. Governments often define jus cogens more narrowly in order to
limit their legal accountability.
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among governments as well as citizens. 9 Courts mandated to settle
disputes over the interpretation and application of such rules are
inevitably confronted with interpretative choices that require
judges to decide on conflicting claims in adversarial, fair
procedures by means of judicial reasoning on the basis of legal
judicial interpretation, "balancing," and
principles, rules,
"optimization.""° European treaties, on the other hand, are
increasingly conceived by European courts as constituting
communities of states as well as of citizens. UN treaties and UN
bodies continue to focus on the "international community of
states" and give only exceptional priority to citizen-oriented
community conceptions over state-centered principles."
Part I of this article argues that, as the customary methods of
international treaty interpretation-codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) -prescribe
"reasonable" interpretations of international treaties in conformity
9. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4.
10.

ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS xxviii (Oxford Univ.

Press 2002) (discussing dual functions of human rights as empowering individuals and
requiring governments to "balance" mutually conflicting human rights so as to "optimize"
legislative and administrative protection of human rights).
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 21U.S.T. 77, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005) (Endorsing the "Responsibility to Protect" civilians from crimes against
humanity, the Resolution states: "The international community, through the United
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII,
on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.") Other exceptions include the increasing recognition of universal
criminal jurisdiction and universal civil jurisdiction for individual responsibility for
violations of fundamental human rights norms. Most international lawyers referring to an
"international constitution" (including jus cogens norms superior to the UN Charter)
emphasize its establishment by the international society of sovereign states. See THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND

OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006);
RONALD ST. J. MACDONALD & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, TOWARDS WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY

(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) In view of the undemocratic nature of most UN
institutions, my own publications have focused on democratic bottom-up constitutionalism
and citizen-oriented multilevel constitutionalism protecting individual freedom by limiting
abuses of governance powers and enabling collective supply of international public goods
(such as a mutually beneficial international trading system among citizens).
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with "principles of justice," "observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all," as well as with other "relevant rules
of international law, ' ' 12 the independence and impartiality of
international courts require judges to interpret citizen-oriented
rules of international economic law with due regard to universal
human rights obligations and other principles of "constitutional
justice," especially whenever legal formalism (e.g., based on lex
posterior, lex specialis, lex superior principles) fails to settle
disputes on just terms. Part II recalls how multilevel judicial
cooperation in Europe-notably between the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance, the European
Community (EC) courts and national courts, the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA) Court and national courts, and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and national courts-has
successfully protected the rule of international law and has
protected the constitutional rights of European citizens at multiple
levels. Part III argues that the European "solange-method" of
multilevel judicial cooperation should be supported by citizens,
judges, civil society and their democratic representatives also in
international economic law beyond Europe. Part IV concludes that
as long as the international legal system continues to be dominated
by power politics and by "constitutional pluralism" reflecting
"reasonable disagreements" among states, the international
cooperation necessary for the collective supply of international
public goods-such as rule of law and an open, efficient world
trading system-requires not only "global administrative law," but
also "multilevel constitutionalism" empowering and constraining
citizens, governments, international organizations, and courts in
their international cooperation for the collective protection of
human rights, rule of law, and "constitutional justice."
I. DE-FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
"CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE"

The American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin begins his
recent book, Justice in Robes, with the story of U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who, on his way to the court,
was greeted by another lawyer: "Do justice, Justice!" Holmes
replied: "I am not here to do justice, but to decide cases according

12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 11, at pmbl.
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to the rules."' 3 Should judges apply positive law and fragmented,
intergovernmental treaty regimes without regard to general
"principles of justice"? Does the separation of judicial power from
legislative and executive powers require that, as postulated by
Montesquieu, court decisions always conform to the exact letter of
the law as understood by the legislator?'4 Do the inter-state
structures of international treaties and of "member-driven
governance" (e.g., in the World Trade Organization (WTO))
require international courts to focus on state interests (as reflected
in treaty texts and interpreted by governments) rather than on the
interests of citizens (as protected by human rights and voiced by
civil society and democratic institutions)?
The VCLT recalls the customary obligation of governments
and courts stating, "disputes concerning treaties, like other
international disputes, should be settled by peaceful means and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law,"
including "respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all."1 While the "general rule of
interpretation" codified in Article 31(1) focuses on textual,
contextual, and functional methods of treaty interpretation,
Article 31 also requires taking into account "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties."'6
The 2006 WTO Panel Report on EC restrictions of genetically
modified organisms argued to interpret Article 31(3)(c) narrowly
as applying only to international law rules binding all parties of the
treaty.V But this narrow interpretation of Article 31(3)(c)
continues to be challenged because, outside the WTO, hardly any
international agreements have been accepted by all WTO
Members, including non-state members like Hong Kong, Macau,
Taiwan and the EC.'8 The alternative interpretation of the text of
Article 31(3)(c) could protect the disputing parties against

13. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES ch. 1 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
14. See generally MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES Lois [THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS]

305 (P. Pourrat Freres eds., 1831) (1748).
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 11, at pmbl.
16. Id. $ 3(c).
17. Panel Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and

Marketing of Biotech Products, %7.65, WT/DS291/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
18. See Members and Observers, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/
english/theWTOe/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (for information
on the trade statistics, WTO commitments, disputes, trade policy reviews, and
notifications of all WTO members).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:367

conflicting legal obligations without prejudging the interpretation
of the treaty obligations of contracting third parties.19
Customary international law prohibits treaty interpretations
with "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" results." The
independence, impartiality and due process guarantees of courts
distinguish the judicial task of dispute settlement on the basis of
the rule of law from the different objectives and procedures of
parliamentary majority politics and administrative decisionmaking. According to the legal philosopher John Rawls, "in a
constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the
reason of its supreme court."2' It is of constitutional importance for
the overlapping, constitutional consensus necessary for a stable
and just society among free, equal, and rational citizens who tend
to be deeply divided by conflicting moral, religious, and
philosophical doctrines.22 Following the universal recognition of
"inalienable" human rights and the adoption of national
constitutions by virtually all 192 UN member states, I have long
argued that the human rights obligations of all governance
institutions, the customary law requirements of international
treaty interpretation, and the independence and due process
guarantees of international courts require internationaljudges to
engage in "public reasoning" clarifying the post-Westihalian
"overlapping constitutional consensus" as a reasonable basis for
settling international disputes in conformity with "principles of
' Like national
justice" and "relevant rules of international law."23
judges offering complainants and defendants "their day in court,"
international judges promote "free trade in ideas,"24 "public
reason, 25 and "justice. 2,6 This may also call for judicial correction

19. Campbell McLachlan, The Principleof Systematic Integration and Article 31(3)(c)
of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279,314 (2005).
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 11, at art. 32.
21. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (1993).
22. See id. at Part II, Lecture IV.
23. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999).
24. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 170 (2007) (1976).
25. See RAWLS, supra note 21 (discussing supreme courts as "the exemplar of public
reason" which can reduce problems resulting from "the fact of reasonable pluralism" by
promoting an "overlapping consensus" on basic political and legal principles among
citizens, notwithstanding their often different and incompatible worldviews).
26. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1999) (discussing "justice as fairness"
and "first virtue of social institutions"); RAINER FORST, DAS RECHT AUF
RECHTFERTIGUNG: ELEMENTE EINER KONSTRUKTIVISTISCHEN THEORIE DER
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of cases of injustice for the benefit of adversely affected citizens.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has been described as "the
' and as the most independent
voice of the national conscience"27
and impartial guardian of the constitutional "checks and balances"
protecting U.S. citizens and their constitutional rights against
potential "tyranny of majorities" and governmental abuses of
powers.
The legal institution of impartial judges has existed since the
beginning of legal civilization. The functional interrelationships
between the law, judges, and justice are reflected in legal language
from antiquity (e.g., in the common core of the Latin terms jus,
judex, justitia) to modern times (e.g., the Anglo-American legal
traditions of speaking of courts of justice, and giving judges the
title of Mr. Justice, Lord Justice, or Chief Justice).29 Like the
Roman god, Janus, justice and judges face two different
perspectives. Their "conservative function" is to apply the existing
law and protect the existing system of rights so as "to render to
each person what is his [right]."" Yet, as laws tend to be
incomplete and subject to change, impartial justice may require
"reformative interpretations" of legal rules in response to changing
social conceptions of justice." This is particularly true following the
universal recognition of inalienable human rights, which call for a
"constitutional paradigm change" based on citizen-oriented
interpretations of the power-oriented structures of international
law. 2 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his final
address as UN Secretary-General to world leaders assembled in
the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2006, criticized the
.UN system as "unjust, discriminatory and irresponsible" in view of
its failures to effectively respond to the three global challenges to
the United Nations: "to ensure that globalization would benefit the
GERECHTIGKEIT (Suhrkamp Verlag 2007) (2005) (inferring from the Kantian idea of
reason based on universal principles that individuals can reasonably claim moral and legal
rights to participation in decision-making that affects them, as well as receive a
justification of restrictions of individual freedoms).
27. ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 27 (1968).
28. DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
149 (1994).
29. D.D. RAPHAEL, CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE 1 (2001).

30. Id. t 2.
31. Id.
32. ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND
THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 135 (2000).
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entire human race; to heal the disorder of the post-Cold War
world, replacing it with a genuinely new world order of peace and
freedom; and to protect the rights and dignity of individuals,33
particularly women, which were so widely trampled underfoot.",
According to Kofi Annan, these three challenges-"an unjust
world economy, world disorder and widespread contempt for
human rights and the rule of law" - entail divisions that "threaten
the very notion of an international community, upon which the
UN stands."3 Especially in citizen-driven areas of international
economic law, national and international judges are increasingly
requested to interpret international guarantees of individual
freedom from citizen-oriented, human rights perspectives." In the
past, judges focused primarily on the state-centered perspective of
governments:" The government representatives all too often
pursued protectionist self-interests in protecting rent-seeking
interest groups.37 They did so in exchange for political support and
in limiting judicial accountability of the rulers for violations of
international law by disempowering citizens and treating them as
mere objects of international rights and obligations of states.'
The legal instruments establishing the courts are not the only
sources of definition for the functions of judges. Since legal
antiquity, judges have also derived powers from the constitutional
instruments of their respective legal systems," often in response to
claims for "justice."' For example, Article III, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution provides that the "judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made.., under their
Authority." Based on this Anglo-Saxon distinction between
statutory law and equity, which limits the permissible content of
33. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, U.N., Speech delivered to the United Nations
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. GA/105000 (Sep. 19, 2006).
34. Id.
35. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, De-Fragmentation of International Economic Law
Through ConstitutionalInterpretationand Adjudication with Due Respect for Reasonable
Disagreement, LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. at 27 (Conference Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.luc.edu/law/activities/publications/ilrsymposium/2008sym/petersmann-defragm
entation-paper.pdf (forthcoming 2009).
36. See generally id.
37. See id. at 18.
38. See id. at 27.
39. For example, constitutional safeguards of the independence of courts in the
Magna Carta and in the U.S. Constitution. See Magna Carta.
40. See id.
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governmental regulations, judicial decisions have often assumed a
crucial role in the development of "constitutional justice."'
Similarly, international courts invoke inherent powers to protect
procedural fairness and principles of reciprocal, corrective, and
distributive justice. For example, principles of equity continue to
guide the delimitation of conflicting claims to maritime waters and
to the underlying seabed.42 Since the advent of democratic
constitutions in the eighteenth century, virtually all UN member
states have adopted constitutions and international agreements
that have progressively expanded the power of judges both
domestically and in international relations. 3 Those constitutions
that mandate a separation of powers provide for even more
comprehensive legal protection of the impartiality, integrity, and
institutional and personal autonomy of judges.' Regional and
worldwide human rights conventions recognize a right of access
"to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law" for the
"determination of civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge."45 Even beyond the realm of human rights agreements,
other international treaties have extended individual rights
pertaining to fair hearings, access to courts and effective legal

41. T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE
OF LAW (2001).
42. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

INSTITUTIONS (Oxford University Press 1997) (1995) (discussing law of the sea and
sharing sea resources in Chapters 12 and 13); CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF

INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007) (discussing generally the inherent powers of
courts as a necessary feature of their judicial functions).
43. See generally CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF
JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (C. A. Thomas, ed.,

2002) (discussing the roots of judicial power historically and its expansion in contemporary
democracies).
44. See JUDICIAL INTEGRITY (Andras Sajo & Lorri Rutt Bentch eds., 2004)
(discussing traditional separation of power theories and institutional integrity and
independence).
45.

DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14-15

(Oxford University Press 2005) (1999); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; American Convention
on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 2, at art. 10 (giving rise to comprehensive case-law clarifying
the rights of access to courts and related guarantees of due process law, e.g., justice
delayed may be justice denied).
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remedies into other fields of law, such as international economic,
labor, social, and environmental law. 6
In the "Federalist Papers," Alexander Hamilton described the
judiciary as "the least dangerous" branch of government, in view of
the fact that courts exercise "no influence over either the sword or
the purse." In modern, multilevel governance systems with both
national and international "checks and balances," courts remain
the most impartial and independent "forum of principle."' For
example, fair and public judicial procedures entitle all parties
involved to present and challenge all relevant arguments. In
addition, judicial decisions often require more comprehensive and
coherent justification than political and administrative decisions.
As laws and international treaties tend to use vague terms and
incomplete rules, the judicial function inevitably goes beyond
being merely "la bouche qui prononce les mots de la loi."' By
choosing among alternative interpretations of rules and "filling
gaps" in the name of justice, judicial decisions interpret,
progressively develop, and complement legislative rules and
intergovernmental treaties. Empirical surveys of the global rise of
judicial power and "judicial governance" confirm the profound
impact of judicial interpretations on the development of national
and international law and policy." Both positivist-legal as well as
moral-prescriptive theories of adjudication justify such judicial
clarification and progressive development of indeterminate legal
46. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
47. Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. 78, June 14,1788.
48. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 32 (1985).
49. MONTESQUIEU,supra note'14.
50. ALEC STONE-SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE (2000) (describing how much third-party dispute resolution and judicial rulemaking have become privileged mechanisms of adapting national and intergovernmental
rule-systems to the needs of citizens and their constitutional rights); ALEC STONE-SWEET,
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE ch. 2 (2004) (analyzing the judicial
"constructing of a supra-national constitution" as a self-reinforcing system driven by selfinterested private market actors, litigators, judges, European parliamentarians and
academic communities); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant
Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR L. REV. 155, 157 (1983) (confirming that, when
deciding the case Van Gend & Loos, the judges had a certain idea of Europe, and that
these judicial ideas, "and not arguments based on legal technicalities of the matter," had
been decisive); TOBIAS MAHNER, DER EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSHOF ALS GERICHT
(Duncker & Humblot 2005) (criticizing "judicial law-making" and the inadequate
democratic legitimacy of the ECJ's expansive case-law limiting national sovereignty in
unforeseen ways, e.g. by judicial recognition of fundamental rights as general principles of
Community law).
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rules (such as general human rights guarantees) on the ground that
independent courts are the most principled guardians of
constitutional rights and of "deliberative, constitutionally limited
democracy," of which the public reasoning of courts is an
important part.5' For example, despite previous attempts by U.S.
legislators and courts to narrowly define the phrase "equal
protection of the laws," the Supreme Court created a system to
judicially enforce equal treatment of minority schoolchildren in
the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, 348 U.S. 483,
495 (1954). Notwithstanding the progressive nature of Brown, it
was supported by the other branches of government and is
celebrated today as a crucial step in carrying out the stated goals of
the U.S. Constitution52 and human rights. 5'
In its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) emphasized that even international legal
institutions ought not to be viewed statically and must be allowed
to interpret international law in light of the legal principles
prevailing at the moment issues arise which implicate them: "an
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of
the interpretation."5 4 International human rights courts (like the
ECHR) and economic courts (like the ECJ) have often
emphasized that effective protection of human rights and nondiscriminatory competition may require "dynamic interpretations"
of international rules with due regard to changing circumstances.
As in domestic legal systems, intergovernmental and judicial rulemaking are intertwined in international relations as well. Because
international treaties tend to be incomplete and are built on
general principles of law,56 the judicial interpretation, clarification

51. See CHRISTOPHER F. ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE
INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 68 (2007) (justifying judicial review as essential for

protecting and promoting deliberative democracy).
52. For example, "to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty." U.S.
CONST. pmbl.

53. Id. at amend. XIV pmbl.
54. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 53 (June 21).

55. Such circumstances may include new risks to human health, competition and the
environment. See CHRISTIAN BONAT, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (The

Federalist Society, 2003) (discussing the European Court of Human Right's history of

dynamic interpretation of the Convention).
56. Id.
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and application of international legal rules may influence the
dynamic evolution and definition of the opinio juris expressed by
governments, judges, parliaments, citizens, and non-governmental
organizations with regard to the progressive development of
international rules. The universal recognition of certain
"inalienable" human rights deriving from respect for human
dignity, and the acceptance by all 192 UN member states of
increasingly specific legal obligations to protect human rights,
demonstrates that citizens57 and judges 8 can today assert no less
cosmopolitan, communitarian, and democratic legitimacy for
defining and protecting human rights than governments that have,
for centuries, disregarded struggles for human rights in
international relations and continue to treat citizens as mere
objects of international law in most UN institutions.59 From the
perspective of citizens and "deliberative democracies," active
judicial protection of constitutional individual rights (including
human
rights)
is
essential
for
"constitutionalising,"
"democracising," and transforming international law into a
constitutional order. This is how it is emerging for the more than
eight hundred million European citizens who are benefiting from
the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
ECHR. This is especially true for the four hundred and eighty
million EC citizens who have been granted, by EC law and by
European courts, constitutional freedoms and social rights that
national governments never protected previously.' The inalienable
"jus cogens" and "erga omnes" core of human rights, and the
judicial obligation to settle disputes "in conformity with principles
of justice and international law," are the foundations, of
"constitutional justice" in constitutional democracies and
international law in the twenty-first century.'

57. Citizens are the "democratic owners" of international law and institutions. ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: Do Judges Meet their Constitutional Obligation to
Settle Disputes in Conformity with 'Principlesof Justice and InternationalLaw'?, 1 EUR. U.
INST. WORKING PAPERS L. 5 (2008), available at http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/
1814/7805/l/LAW-2008-01.pdf [hereinafter Petersmann, JudgingJudges].
58. Judges are the most independent and impartial guardians of the "principles of
justice" underlying international law. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally ConstitutionalFunctions,supra note 3.
61. UN Charter art. 1.
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II. MULTILEVEL JUDICIAL PROTECTION BY EUROPEAN COURTS OF
RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND "CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE"

Europe has a long history of multilevel judicial governance in
regional economic unions,62 functional organizations,63 and in
(con)federal associations of states. 4 European integration law also
illustrates that the fragmentation of national and international
rules and treaty regimes may be more easily reduced by multilevel
judicial governance than by multilevel legislative
and
administrative cooperation. The conditional cooperation among
European courts draws attention to potential advantages of legal
fragmentation, by inducing European courts to protect citizens
against abuses of foreign policy powers in conformity with
6 Since the VCLT does not
constitutional principles of subsidiarity.
always provide satisfactory responses to the power-oriented
fragmentation and frequent abuses of international law, European
experiences with "judicial integration" of fragmented treaty
regimes on the basis of principles of "constitutional justice" may
offer complementary, and more effective "constitutional
safeguards." 6 The transformation of the intergovernmental EC
treaties and of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) into objective constitutional orders protecting citizens'
rights across national frontiers'67was driven by diverse kinds of
"multilevel judicial governance:
- The multilevel judicial governance in the EC among
national courts and European courts remains characterized
by the supranational structures of EC law. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the fundamental freedoms
and related social guarantees provided by EC law generally
go far beyond the national laws of EC member states.6'
62. See, e.g., The Benelux Court of Justice, http://www.benelux.be/en/bnl/
bnl-inst-gerechtshof.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
63. See, e.g., the supranational Rhine River Court, based on the Rhine River
Navigation Act of 1868.
64. See, e.g., the Reichskammergericht in the Holy Roman Empire of a German
Nation.
65. E.g., consider human rights recognized in UN conventions protected by more
comprehensive domestic constitutional safeguards of human rights, and by European
courts even vis-A-via UN Security Council sanctions.
66. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
'Constitutional Justice', 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 769, 775 (2008) [hereinafter Petersmann,
'ConstitutionalJustice].
67. Id.
68. Id.
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The multilevel judicial governance of national courts and
the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) in the field
of human rights differs from that of European economic
law in many ways. For example, both the ECtHR and the
Convention assert only subsidiary constitutional functions
vis-A-vis national human rights guarantees and respect the
diverse democratic traditions of the forty-seven countries
that have ratified the Convention."
- The multilevel judicial governance among national courts
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court
has extended the EC's common market law to the three
EFTA members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) of
the European Economic Area
(EEA) through
intergovernmental modes of cooperation rather than by
using the EC's constitutional principles of legal primacy,
direct effect, and direct applicability of the EC's common
market law. This alternative model of multilevel judicial
cooperation (e.g., based on voluntary compliance with
legally non-binding preliminary opinions by the EFTA
Court) has demonstrated that citizens in third countries can
effectively benefit from the EC's legal "market freedoms"
and social benefits without the EC's supranational
integration law.'
Part II of this article provides an overview of the diverse
forms of "judicial dialogues," "judicial cooperation," judicial
resistance, and judicial self-restraint among national courts, the
EC courts, the EFTA Court and the ECtHR. Part III uses these
European experiences to illustrate that the "solange-method"used
by courts in Europe for their conditional cooperation in their
multilevel judicial protection of constitutional rights should also
serve as a model for promoting judicial cooperation, comity (e.g.,
through foreign jurisdictions protecting constitutional rights), and
judicial self-restraint (e.g., through domestic legislatures protecting
constitutional rights) beyond Europe. The "solange-method"
should serve as a model in the judicial interpretation and
progressive development of international economic and
environmental law, human rights law, and related constitutional
rights of citizens.
-

69. Id.
70. Id.
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A. Multilevel JudicialProtectionof European Law Inside the EC
The EC's common market with free movement of goods,
services, persons, capital, and payments can remain effective only
to the extent that the EC's common market and competition rules
are coherently applied and protected in the national courts of all
twenty-seven EC member states. The declared objective of an
"ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"7 was to be
brought about by economic and legal integration .requiring
additional law-making and common policies by the European
institutions. The EC Treaty differs from other international
treaties in its innovative judicial safeguards for the protection of
the rule of law. This is accomplished not only in intergovernmental
relations among EC member states, but also in the citizen-driven
common market and in the common policies of the European
2
Communities.
most international jurisdictions remain
characterized byWhereas
intergovernmental procedures,73 the EC Treaty
provides unique legal remedies not only for member states, but
also for EC citizens and EC institutions as guardians of EC law
and of its "constitutional functions" for correcting "governance
failures" at national and European levels:"
- The citizen-driven cooperation among national courts and
the ECJ in the context of preliminary rulings procedures
has uniquely empowered national and European judges to
cooperate, at the request of EC citizens, in the multilevel
judicial protection of citizen rights protected by EC law."
- The empowerment of the European Commission to initiate
infringement proceedings 6 rendered the ECJ's function as
an intergovernmental court more effective than it would
have been under purely inter-state infringement
proceedings."
- The Court's "constitutional functions" (e.g., in the case of
actions by Member States or EC institutions for annulment

71. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1,
pmbl. [hereinafter EC Treaty].
72. Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 57, at 6-7.
73. See, e.g., the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Law of the Sea
Tribunal and the WTO dispute settlement bodies.
74. Petersmann, JudgingJudges,supra note 57, at 7.
75. EC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 234.
76. Id. at art. 226.
77. Id. at art. 227.
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of EC regulations), as well as its functions as an
"administrative court" (e.g., protecting private rights and
rule of law in response to direct actions by natural or legal
persons for annulment of EC acts, failure to act, or actions
for damages), offered unique legal remedies for
maintaining and developing the constitutional coherence of
EC law.
- The EC Court's teleological reasoning based on
communitarian needs (e.g., in terms of protection of EC
citizen rights, consumer welfare, and of undistorted
competition in the common market) justified judicial
protection of unwritten "fundamental freedoms" of EC
citizens that would not have been acceptable in purely
intergovernmental treaty regimes."
The diverse forms of judicial dialogues (e.g., on the
interpretation and protection of fundamental rights), judicial
contestation (e.g., of the scope of EC competences), and judicial
cooperation (e.g., in preliminary ruling procedures) were based on
the multilevel, judicial' protection of common constitutional
principles. Those principles were derived from the EC Member
States' obligations under their national constitutions, the ECHR
(as interpreted by the ECtHR), as well as under the EC's
constitutional law.' This judicial respect for "constitutional
pluralism" promoted judicial comity among national courts, the
ECJ, and the ECtHR in their complementary, multilevel
protection of constitutional rights.8 This was with due respect for
the diversity of national constitutional and judicial traditions. 2 The
progressively expanding legal protection of fundamental rights in
EC law-in response to their judicial protection by national and
European courts-illustrates how judicial cooperation in the field
of economic law can promote judicial protection of constitutional

78. Petersmann, JudgingJudges,supra note 57, at 7.
79. Id.
80. Franz C. Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts, in PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jorgen Bast eds., 2006)
(discussing the interpretation and protection of fundamental rights and the scope of EC
competences in preliminary ruling procedures).
81. Petersmann, 'ConstitutionalJustice',supra note 66, at 777.
82. Id.
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rights. Judge A. Rosas' has distinguished the following five
"stages" in the case-law of the EC Court on the protection of
human rights:'
- In the supra-national, but functionally limited European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Court held that it
lacked competence to examine whether an ECSC decision
amounted to an infringement of fundamental rights as
recognized in the constitution of a member state. 85
- Since the Stauder judgment of 1969, the EC Court has
clarified in numerous judgments that fundamental rights
form part of the general principles of community law
binding the member states and EC institutions, and that the
EC Court ensures their observance.'
- As of 1975, the ever more extensive case-law of the EC
courts explicitly refers to the ECHR and protects ever
more human rights and fundamental freedoms in a wide
array of Community law areas, including civil, political,
economic, social, and labor rights, drawing inspiration
"from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States and from the guidelines supplied by international
treaties for the protection of human rights on which the
have collaborated or of which they are
Member States
signatories.""8
- Since 1989, the ECHR has been characterized by the EC
Court as having "particular significance" for the
interpretation and development of EU law' in view of the
fact that the ECHR is the only international human rights
convention mentioned in Article 6 EU.

83.

Allan Rosas, Fundamental Rights in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, in

THE EFTA COURT: TEN YEARS ON 163, 169 (Carl Baudenbacher, Per Tresselt &
Thorgeir Orlygsson eds., 2005).
84. Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 57, at 19.
85. Case 1/58, Storck v. European Coal & Steel Cmty. High Auth., 1959 E.C.R. 43.
86. The ECJ's judicial protection of human rights since 1969 continues to evolve.
Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 4-73, Nold v. Comm'n, 1974
E.C.R. 491.

87. See, e.g., Case C-2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
88. Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm'n of the European
Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 2859 1 13.
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In the 1990s, the EC courts began to refer to individual
judgments
of the ECtHR and clarified that-in reconciling
economic freedoms
guaranteed by EC law with human
rights guarantees of the ECHR that admit restrictions-all
interests involved have to be weighed "having regard to all
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a
fair balance was struck between those interests," without
giving priority to the economic freedoms of the EC Treaty
at the expense of other fundamental rights.' The EC courts
have also been willing to adjust their case-law to new
developments in the case-law of the ECtHR," and to
differentiate-as in the case-law of the ECtHR-between
judicial review of EC measures,' state measures, 9' and
private restrictions of economic freedoms in the light of
other fundamental rights.94

89. Case C-13/94, P v. S, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 16.
90. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5659.
91. Case C-94/00, Roquette Fr~res SA v. Directeur G6n~ral de ]a Concurrence, de la
29. The ECJ
Consommation et de la Repression des Fraudes, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9011
referred explicitly to new case-law of the ECHR on the protection of the right to privacy
of commercial enterprises in order to explain why-despite having suggested the opposite
in the ECJ's earlier judgment in Hoechst-such enterprises may benefit from Article 8
ECHR: "For the purposes of determining the scope of that principle in relation to the
protection of business premises, regard must be had to the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights subsequent to the judgment in Hoechst. According to that caselaw, first, the protection of the home provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR may in certain
circumstances be extended to cover such premises (see, in particular, the judgment of 16
April 2002 in Colas Est and Others v. Frances, not yet published in the Reports of
Judgments and Decision, § 41) and, second, the right of interference established by Article
8(2) of the ECHR might well be more far-reaching where professional or business
I.."
Id.
activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case .
92. See Stauder, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Internationale Handelsgesellschaf, 1970 E.C.R.
1125; Nold, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
93. See Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
OberbUrgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9609 (in which the ECJ
acknowledged that the restriction of market freedoms could be necessary for the
protection of human dignity despite the fact that the German conception of protecting
human dignity as a human right was not shared by all other EC member states).
94. See MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING
THE STRUCTURE OF ECHR PROTECTION (Oxford Univ. Press 2006). Also see the recent
judgments by the ECJ, Case C-438/05, Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP,
2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2396 (Dec. 11, 2007) as well as Case C-341/05, Laval un
Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, 2007 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2399
(Dec. 18, 2007) (in which the EC Court recognized that trade unions are legally bound by
the EC's common market freedoms, and that the private plaintiffs in these cases can rely
directly on the EC Treaty in their judicial challenge of restrictions imposed on market
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B. Multilevel JudicialEnforcement of the ECHR: Subsidiary
"ConstitutionalFunctions" of the ECHR
The ECHR, like most other international human rights
conventions, sets out minimum standards for the treatment of
individuals that respect the diversity of democratic constitutional
traditions, which define individual rights in democratic
communities. The fourteen protocols to the ECHR and the
European Social Charter (as revised in 1998) also reflect, the
constitutional experiences in some European countries (like
France and Germany) in protecting economic and social rights, as
integral parts of their constitutional and economic laws. For
example, in order to avoid a repetition of the systemic political
abuses of economic regulation prior to 1945,"5 the ECHR also
includes guarantees of property rights. 6 The jurisdiction of the
ECtHR for the collective enforcement of the ECHR-based on
complaints not only by member states but also by private
persons-prompted the Court to interpret the ECHR as a
constitutional charter of Europe,97 protecting human rights across
Europe as an objective "constitutional instrument of European
public order." 8 The multilevel judicial interpretation and
protection of fundamental rights, as well as of their governmental
restriction "in the interests of morals, public order or national
security in a democratic society, '" are constitutional in nature. But
ECtHR judges rightly emphasize the subsidiary functions of the
ECHR and of its court:

freedoms by trade unions invoking their social rights to strike (e.g., in order to prevent
relocation of the companies Viking Line to other EC member states)).
95. For example, the wide-ranging guarantees of economic regulation and legally
enforceable social rights in Germany's 1919 Constitution for the "Weimar Republic" led
to ever more restrictive government interventions into labor markets, capital markets,
interest rates, as well as to expropriations "in the general interest" which-during the Nazi
dictatorship from 1933 to 1945-led to systemic political abuses of these regulatory
powers.
96. Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treatylenTreaties/HtmlOO5.htm.
97. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
98. See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 75 (1995)
(Referring to the status of human rights in Europe; unlike the ECJ, the ECtHR has no
jurisdiction for judicial review of acts of the international organization (the Council of
Europe) of which the Court forms part of.).
99. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at art. 6.
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These issues are more properly decided, in conformity with
the subsidiary logic of the system of protection set up by the
European Convention on Human Rights, by the national
judicial authorities themselves and notably courts of
constitutional jurisdiction. European control is a fail-safe
device designed to catch the breaches that escape
° the
rigorous scrutiny of the national constitutional bodies.
The court aims to resist the "temptation of delving too deep
into issues of fact and of law, of becoming the infamous "fourth
instance" that it has always insisted it is not....' The court also
exercises deference by recognizing that the democratically elected
legislatures in the member states enjoy a "margin of appreciation"
in the balancing of public and private interests. That is, provided
that the measure taken in the general interest bears a reasonable
relationship of proportionality both to the aim pursued and the
effect on the individual interest, it should be upheld. 2 Rather than
imposing uniform approaches to the diverse human rights
problems in ECHR member states, the ECtHR often exercises
judicial self-restraint, for example:
- by leaving the process of implementing its judgments to the
member states, subject to the "peer review" by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, rather
than asserting judicial powers to order consequential
measures;03
- by viewing the discretionary scheme of Article 41 ECHR
for awarding just satisfaction as being secondary to the
primary aim of the ECHR to protect minimum standards of
human rights protection in all Convention states;"'4
- by concentrating on "constitutional decisions of principle"
and "pilot proceedings" that appear to be relevant for many
individual complaints and for the judicial protection of a
European public order based on human rights, democracy
and the rule of law; and

100. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human
Rights?, 23 HuM. RTS. L.J. 161 (2002).
101. Id.
102. See Jeroen Schokkenbrock, The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin-ofAppreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 30, 31 (1998).
103. Id.

104. Wildhaber, supra note 100, at 164.
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- by filtering out early, manifestly ill-founded complaints
because the Court perceives its "individual relief function"
as being subsidiary to its constitutional function. 5
Article 34 of the ECHR permits individual complaints not
only "from any person," but also from "non-governmental
organizations or groups of individuals claiming to be the victim of
a violation" of ECHR rights by one of the state parties.'" The
African, American, Arab, and UN human rights conventions
protect human rights only of individuals and of people, whereas,
the ECHR and the European Social Charter also protect human
rights of non-governmental legal organizations (NGOs).' °7 The
protection of .this collective dimension of human rights (e.g., of
legal persons that are composed of natural persons) has prompted
the ECtHR to protect procedural human rights (e.g., under
Articles 6, 13, 34 ECHR) as well as substantive human rights of
companies (e.g., under Articles 8, 10, 11 ECHR, Protocol 1)"(8 in
conformity with the national constitutional traditions in many
European states as well as inside the EC (e.g., the EC guarantees
of market freedoms and other economic and social rights of
companies). The rights and freedoms of the ECHR can thus be
divided into three groups:
- Some rights are inherently limited to natural persons (e.g.,
Article 2 ECHR, right to life) and focus on their legal
protection (e-g., prohibition of torture in Article 3 ECHR;
prohibition of arbitrary detention in Article 5 ECHR;
freedom of conscience in Article 9 ECHR).'
- But some provisions of the ECHR also explicitly protect
rights of "legal persons.""'
- Rights of companies have become recognized by the
ECtHR also with respect to other ECHR provisions that
105. Id.
106. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at art. 34.
107. Id. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Part I: Rights and Duties, Ch.
I: Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Arab Charter on Human
Rights Part II, Sept. 15, 1994, reprintedin 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997).
108. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at arts. 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 34; Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 96.
109. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at arts. 2, 3, 5, 9.
110. See, e.g., property rights protected in Protocol 1 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 96, at art.1.
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protect rights of "everybody" without mentioning the rights
of NGOs; most notably rights of companies to invoke the
right to a fair trial in the determination of civil rights,"' the3
112
right to respect of one's home, freedom of expression,"
freedom of assembly,"' freedom of religion,"5 the right to an
effective remedy,"6 and the right to request compensation
for non-material damage."7 Freedom of contract and
economic activity is not specifically protected in the
ECHR, which focuses on civil and political rights, but the
right to form companies in order to pursue private interests
collectively is protected by the freedom of association,"8 the
right to property,"' and indirectly, by the protection of "civil
rights" in Article 6 ECHR"2
This broad scope of human rights protection is reflected in the
requirement of Article 1 ECHR to secure the human rights "to
everyone within their jurisdiction.' 2' It also protects traders and
companies from outside Europe and may cover even state acts
implemented outside the national territory of ECHR member
states or implementing obligations under EC law.' Yet, compared
to the large number of complaints by companies to the ECJ, less
than four percent of judgments by the ECtHR relate to complaints
made by companies. 3 So far, such complaints have mainly
concerned Article 6(1) ECHR (right to a fair trial), Article 8
ECHR (right to respect of one's home and correspondence),
Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression including commercial

111. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at art. 6.
112. Id. at art. 8.
113. Id. at art. 10.
114. Id. at art. 11.
115. Id. at art. 9.
116. Id. at art. 13.
117. Id. at art. 41.
118. Id. at art. 11.
119. Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 96.
120. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at art. 6.
121. Id. at art. 1
122. Id. at art. 1.
123. EMBERLAND, supra note 94, at 14.
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free speech), and the guarantee of property rights in Protocol 1 to
the ECHR.'2
Similar to the constitutional and teleological interpretation
methods used by the ECJ, the ECtHR-in its judicial
interpretation of the ECHR-applies principles of "effective
interpretation" aimed at protecting human rights in a practical and
effective manner. These principles of effective treaty
interpretation include a principle of "dynamic interpretation" of
the ECHR as a "constitutional instrument of European public
order" that must be interpreted with due regard to contemporary
realities so as to protect "an effective political democracy" (which
is mentioned in the Preamble as an objective of the ECHR).'25
Limitations of fundamental rights of economic actors are reviewed
by the ECtHR as to whether they are determined by law, in
conformity with the ECHR, and whether they are "necessary to a
democratic society.', 126 Governmental limitations of civil and
political human rights tend to be reviewed by the ECtHR more
strictly (e.g., as to whether they maintain an appropriate balance
between the human right concerned and the need for "an effective
political democracy") than governmental restrictions of private
economic activity. Governmental restrictions of private economic
activity tend to be reviewed by the Court on the basis of a more
lenient standard of judicial review respecting a "margin of
appreciation" for governments. 127
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR protects "peaceful
enjoyment of possessions" (paragraph one)." The term "property"
is used only in paragraph two.' 29 The ECtHR has clarified that
Article 1 guarantees rights of property not only in corporeal things
(rights in rem), but also intellectual property rights and private law
124. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 45, at arts. 6(1), 8, 10 (art. 8, right to respect for one's home and
correspondence; art. 10, freedom of expression including commercial free speech);
Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supranote 96.
125. On the Court's teleological interpretation of the ECHR in the light of its "object
and purpose" see EMBERLAND, supra note 94, at 20.
126. THEMISTOKLIS K. GIANNAKOPOULOS, SAFEGUARDING COMPANIES' RIGHTS IN
COMPETITION AND ANTI-DUMPING/ANTI-SUBSIDIES PROCEEDINGS 95 (Kluwer Law
Int'l 2004).

127. Id. at 96-97.
128.

Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human

Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 96, at art. 1
129. Id. at arts. 1-2.
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or public law claims in personam (e.g., monetary claims based on
private contracts, employment and business rights, pecuniary
claims against public authorities). "° In Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy,
the Court also recognized positive state duties to protect private.
property.' For example, the duties include providing police
assistance in evacuating a tenant from the applicant's apartment.
The lack of police assistance in executing a judicial order to
evacuate a tenant was found to constitute a breach of the
applicant's property right.' 2 The inclusion of the right to property
into the ECHR confirms that property is perceived as a
fundamental right that is indispensable for personal self-realization
and dignity.'3 As the moral justifications of private property do not
warrant absolute property rights, Article 1 of Protocol 1 to ECHR
recognizes-in conformity with the constitutional traditions of
many national European constitutions, which emphasize individual
as well as social functions of property -that private property can
be restricted for legitimate reasons.' The case-law of the ECtHR
confirms that such restrictions may include, for example:33
- taxation for the common financing of public goods
(including redistributive taxation if it can be justified on
grounds of reciprocal benefit, correction of past injustices
or redistributive justice);

130. On private law and constitutional law meanings of property (as a relationship to
objects of property and to other legal subjects that have to respect property rights), and on
the different kinds of property protected in the case-law of the ECtHR, see AL! RIZA
QOBAN, PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS chs. 2, 6 (2004).
131. Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 (1999).
132. Id.
133. On the moral foundations of market freedoms see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29, 36 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2006);
QOBAN, supra note 130, at ch. 3. (justifies property rights as prima facie human rights on
the basis of four arguments: (1) both the use value and the exchange value of property are
essential for private autonomy; (2) a system of private property is also essential for
personal self-realization; (3) respect for individual autonomy requires respect for the
entitlement of people to the fruits of their labor as well as respect for the outcome of
peaceful, voluntary cooperation (e.g., in markets driven by consumer demand and
competition); and (4) a system of private property further encourages fruitful initiative
and an autonomy-enhancing society based on welfare-increasing competition, division of
labour and satisfaction of consumer demand).
134. Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 96, at art. 1.
135. Petersmann, Judging Judges,supra note 57, at 11.
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governmental control of harmful uses of property (e.g., by
police power regulations designed to prevent harm to
others); as well as
government takings of property by power of eminent
domain, whose lawful exercise depends on the necessity
and proportionality of the taking for realizing a legitimate
public interest and-if the taking imposes a discriminatory

burden only on some individuals-may require payment of
compensation for the property taken.
Even though the ECtHR respects a wide margin of
appreciation, allowing states to limit and interfere with property

rights (e.g., by means of taxation) 36 and to balance individual and
public interests (e.g., in case of a taking of property without full
compensation),'37 the Court's expansive protection-as property or
"possessions"-of almost all pecuniary interests and legitimate

expectations arising from private and public law relationships
reveals a strong judicial awareness of the importance of private
economic activities and economic law for personal self-realization,
dignity and effective protection of human rights. "8 The court's
review of governmental limitations of, and interferences with,
property rights is based on "substantive due process" standards
that go far beyond the "procedural due process" standards that

have been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court since the 1930s."9 In
the unique European context of an ever broader "social market
economy" across the forty-seven member states of the Council of
Europe, the ECtHR's constitutional approach to the protection of
broadly defined property rights and fundamental freedoms,
including those of companies, appears appropriate.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The U.S. Constitution (Amendments V and XIV) includes strong guarantees of
private liberty and property rights against takings without "due process of law" and "just
compensation." Up to the late 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently overturned
legislation on the ground that it violated economic liberties. Yet, since the Democrats took
over the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937, the Court has limited judicial protection of
"substantive due process of law" essentially to civil and political rights. In the field of
economics, the Court introduced a constitutional presumption which states that legislative
restrictions of private property are lawful and no longer subject to judicial review of
"economic due process of law." See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938). Moreover, the commerce clause in the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee
individual economic liberties as in the EC Treaty, but merely gives regulatory authority to
the U.S. Congress. Petersmann, JudgingJudges,supra note 57, at 11 n.29.
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C. Diversity of Multilevel Judicial Governance in Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs): The Example of the EFTA Court
The 1992 Agreement between the EC and EFTA States
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) establishing the EEA'4 0 isin terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Article XXIV-the most judicially-developed of greater than two
hundred and fifty Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) concluded after
World War IV.4 The EFTA Court illustrates the diversity of

judicial procedures and approaches to the interpretation of
international trade law, and confirms the importance of "judicial
dialogues" among international and domestic courts for the
promotion of the rule of law in international trade.42' In order to
ensure that the extension of the EC's common market law to the
EFTA countries functions in the same manner as in the EC's
internal market, the 1991 Draft Agreement for the EEA provided
for the establishment of an EEA Court, composed of judges from
the ECJ as well as from EFTA countries. 43 In Opinion 1/91, the
ECJ objected to the structure and competence of such an EEA
Court on the ground that its legally binding interpretations could
adversely affect the autonomy and exclusive jurisdiction (Articles
220, 292 EC) of the ECJ (e.g., for interpreting the respective
competences of the EC and EC Member States concerning matters
governed by EEA provisions). Following the Court's negative
Opinion, the EEA Agreement's provisions on judicial supervision
were re-negotiated and the EEA Court was replaced by an EFTA
Court with more limited jurisdiction and composed only of judges
from EFTA countries. In a second Opinion, the ECJ confirmed
the consistency of the revised EEA Agreement'45 subject to certain
legal interpretations of this agreement by the Court.'" In order to
promote legal homogeneity between EC and EEA market law,

140. Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3 [hereinafter EEA
Agreement].
141. Id. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
142. Petersman, Judging Judges,supra note 57, at 12.
143. Opinion 1/91, On a Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation of the European
Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079 [hereinafter Opinion 1/91].
144. Id. 1 31-36.
145. EEA Agreement, supra note 140.
146. Opinion 1/92, Second Opinion on the European Economic Area, 1992 E.C.R. I2821.
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Article 6 of the revised EEA Agreement provides for the
following principle of interpretation:
Without prejudice to future developments of case-law, the
provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are
identical in substance to corresponding rules of the [EC
Treaty and the ECSC Treaty] and to acts adopted in
application of these two Treaties, shall, in their
implementation and application, be interpreted in
conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of
Justice of the [EC] given prior to the date of signature of
the agreement.'
The EFTA Court took up its functions in January 1994."8
Following the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EC
in 1995, the Court moved its seat to Luxembourg and continues to
be composed of three judges nominated by Iceland, Liechtenstein,
and Norway. 149 According to the 1994 Agreement between the
EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority
and a Court of Justice (SCA),' ° the Court has jurisdiction for
infringement proceedings by the EFTA Surveillance Authority
against an EFTA state (Article 31 SCA), actions concerning the
settlement of disputes between EFTA states (Article 32 SCA),
advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement
(Article 33 SCA), review of penalties imposed by the EFTA
Surveillance Authority (Article 35 SCA), as well as jurisdiction in
actions brought by an EFTA state or by natural or legal persons
against decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (Article 36
SCA) or alleging failure to act (Article 37 SCA). Out of the sixtytwo cases lodged during the first ten years of the EFTA Court,
eighteen related to direct actions, forty-two concerned requests by

147. The limitation to prior case-law was due to the refusal by EFTA countries to
commit themselves to unforeseeable, future case-law of the EU courts on which they are
not represented. Vassilios Skouris, The ECJ and the EFTA Court Under the EEA
Agreement: A Paradigm for International Cooperation Between Judicial Institutions, in
THE EFTA COURT: TEN YEARS ON 123, 124 (Baudenbacher et al. eds., 2005) (concludes,
however, that "it does not seem that the EFTA Court has treated the ECJ case-law
differently depending on when the pertinent judgments were rendered.").
148. See EFTA, EFTA History at a Glance, http://www.efta.int/contentlabout-

efta/history.
149. See EFTA Court, Introduction to the EFTA Court, http://www.eftacourt.int/
index.php/court/mission/introduction.

150. Agreement on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of
Justice, May 2, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 344) 1, arts. 31-33, 35.
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national courts for advisory opinions, and two related to requests
for legal aid and suspension of a measure. " '
In its interpretation of EC law provisions that are identical to
EEA rules (e.g., concerning common market and competition
rules), the EEA Court has regularly followed ECJ case-law and
has realized the homogeneity objectives of EEA law in terms of
the outcome of cases, if not their legal reasoning. In its very first
case, Restamark,52' the EFTA Court interpreted the notion of court

or tribunal (in the sense of Article 34 SCA regarding requests by
national courts for preliminary opinions) by proceeding from the
six-factor-test applied by the ECJ in its interpretation of the
corresponding' provision in Article 234 EC: the referring body
must, in order to constitute a "court or tribunal," (1) be
established by law (rather than by private agreement as in the case
of commercial arbitration); (2) be permanent; (3) have compulsory
jurisdiction for legally binding decisions on issues of a justiciable
nature (res judicata); (4) conduct inter-partesprocedures; (5) apply
rules of law and evidence; and (6) be independent.53' Yet, the
EFTA Court considered the request admissible even if, as
frequently found in administrative court proceedings in Finland
and Sweden, only one party appeared in the proceedings. In the
5
1997 case of Dorsch Consult'4 and the 2000 case of Gabalfrisa,'
the ECJ followed suit and acknowledged that the inter-partes
requirement was not absolute.' 6 The EFTA Court's case-law on
questions of locus standi of private associations to bring an action
for nullity of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority offers
another example of liberal interpretations by the EFTA Court of
procedural requirements.' 7

151. Hans Petter Graver, The Effects of EFTA Court Jurisprudence on the Legal
Orders of the EFTA States, in THE EFrA COURT 79 n.27 (Carl Baudenbacher et al. eds.,
2005).
152. Case E-1/94, Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, 1994-95 Rep.
EFTA Ct. 15, 16 [hereinafter Case E-1/94].
153. Id.

154. Case
C-54/96,
Dorsch
Consult
Ingenieurgesellschaft
mbH
v.
Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4961.
155. Joined Cases C-110-147/98, Gabalfrisa SL and Others v. Agencia Estatal de
Administracion Tributaria, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1577.
156. Id.
157. Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court Ten Years On, in THE EFTA COURT TEN

YEARS ON 24 n.27 (Carl Baudenbacher, Per Tresselt & Thorgeir Orlygsson eds., 2005)
(suggesting this liberal tendency might be influenced by the fact that the EFTA Court,
unlike the ECJ, is not overburdened).
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In Opinion 1/91, the EC Court held that the Community law
principles of legal primacy and direct effect were not applicable to
the EEA Agreement and were "irreconcilable" with its
characteristics as an international agreement conferring rights only
on the participating states and the EC.'58 The EFTA Court, in its
Restamark judgment of December 1994, followed Protocol 35 (on
achieving a homogenous EEA based on common rules) and found
that individuals and economic operators must be entitled to invoke
and to claim at the national level any rights that could be derived
from precise and unconditional EBA provisions if they had been
made part of the national legal orders. 59 In its 2002 Einarsson
judgment, the EFTA Court, again following Protocol 35, stated
that such provisions with quasi-direct effect must take legal
precedence over conflicting provisions of national law." Already
in 1998, in its Sveinbjornsdottir judgment, the EFTA Court
characterized the legal nature of the EEA Agreement as an
international treaty sui generis that had created a distinct legal
order of its own; 6' the court therefore found that the principle of
state liability for breaches of EEA law must be presumed to be
part of EEA law.'62 This judicial recognition of the corresponding
EC law principles was confirmed in the 2002 Karlsson judgment,
where the EFTA Court further held that EEA law-while not
prescribing that individuals and economic operators be able to
directly rely on non-implemented EEA rules before national
courts-required national courts to consider relevant EBA rules,
whether implemented or not, when interpreting international and
domestic law.'
III. LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN "SOLANGE-METHOD" OF
JUDICIAL COOPERATION FOR WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

From the perspectives of economics and international law,
Free Trade Agreements are sometimes viewed as sub-optimal
compared to the rules of the WTO for trade liberalization, rule-

158. Opinion 1/91, supra, note 143, 28.
159. Case E-1/94, supra, note 152, at 16.
160. Case E-1/01, Einarsson v. Icelandic State, 2002 Rep. EFTA Ct. 1.
161. Case E-7/97, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Kingdom of Norway, 1998 Rep.
EFIA Ct. 62, 95.
162. Id.
163. Case E-4/01, Karl K. Karlsson hf. v. Icelandic State, 2002 Rep. EFTA Ct. 240, 248.
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making and compulsory dispute settlement at worldwide levels.

For example:
- While most FTAs only provide for diplomatic dispute
settlement procedures (e.g., consultations, mediation,

conciliation, panel procedures subject to political approval
by member states) without preventing their member
countries from submitting trade disputes through the quasi
judicial WTO
dispute settlement procedure,
the
compulsory WTO dispute settlement system may offer
comparatively more effective legal remedies. This is
illustrated by the fact that most of the intergovernmental
trade disputes among the three member countries of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have
been submitted to the WTO dispute settlement system
rather than through the legally weaker dispute settlement
-

procedures of Chapter 20 of the NAFTA Agreement.1
Submission of trade disputes among FTA member
countries to the WTO has only rarely given rise to legal
problems.165 The rare instances in which successive
invocations of FTA and WTO dispute settlement
procedures challenged the same trade measure" did not

164. See generally W.J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A
Comment, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 343-57

(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2007). There have been only three
intergovernmental disputes under Chapter 20 since NAFTA entered into force in 1994.
On the other six NAFTA dispute settlement procedures and their very diverse records see
generally A.L.C. de Mestral, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Creative Experiment or
Confusion?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 359-81

(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2007).
165. For example, in the WTO dispute between the United States and Canada over
Canadian restrictions on "split-run periodicals." Panel Report, Canada-CertainMeasures
Concerning Periodicals,WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997) (adopted July 30, 1997). Canada did
not consider itself entitled to justification under the WTO in its violation of GATT Article
III by invoking Article 2106 NAFTA permitting preferential measures in favor of cultural
industries. A.L.C. de Mestral, supra note 164, at 364-65 n.61. Also, the Appellate Body
upheld a WTO Panel's conclusion that the Panel had no discretion "to decline to exercise
its jurisdiction" based on the existence of a NAFTA dispute on an allegedly related
matter. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, IT 44-53, WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10 (Mar. 6, 2006) (adopted May 9, 2006).
166. Examples would include challenges of U.S. import restrictions on Canadian
lumber in both NAFTA and WTO panels, challenges of EC import restrictions on
bananas and genetically modified organisms in the ECJ and in the WTO, challenges of
Argentine import restrictions on cotton and of Brazilian import restrictions of retreaded
tires in both Mercosur and WTO dispute settlement proceedings. K. Kwak & G.
Mareceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of JurisdictionBetween the WTO and Regional Trade
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amount to "abuses of rights," because WTO Members have
rights to conclude regional trade agreements with separate
dispute settlement procedures as well as rights to the quasi
automatic establishment of WTO dispute settlement bodies
that examine complaints in the WTO on the different legal.
basis of WTO law.'67
Yet, from the perspective of citizens and their economic rights
as protected by courts in Europe, the EC and EFTA courts offer
citizens direct access and judicial remedies that appear
economically more efficient, legally more effective, and
democratically more legitimate than politicized, intergovernmental
procedures among states for the settlement of disputes involving
private economic actors. The fact that the ECJ has rendered only
three judgments in international disputes among EC member
states since the establishment of the ECJ in 1952, illustrates that
many intergovernmental disputes (e.g., over private rights) could
be prevented or settled by alternative dispute settlement
procedures if governments would grant private economic actors
more effective legal and judicial remedies in national and regional
courts against governmental restrictions." Unfortunately, some
national and international judges fail to cooperate in their judicial
protection of the rule of law in international relations beyond the
EC and ECHR. For instance, U.S. courts claim that WTO dispute
settlement rulings "are not binding on the United States, much less
this court;"'69 similarly, the EC Court has refrained-at the request
of the political EC institutions who have repeatedly misled the
ECJ about the interpretation of WTO obligations so as to limit
their own judicial accountability' 7 -from reviewing the legality of

Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 465-85

(L. Bartels & F. Ortino eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
167. Petersmann, JudgingJudges, supra note 57, at 15.
168. Id.
169. Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348 (2005). In the Corus
Staal dispute, the U.S. Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari on January 9, 2006,
despite an amicus curiae brief filed by the EC Commission supporting this petition ("We
argue that the Federal Circuit went too far by construing the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act to make considerations of compliance with international obligations completely
irrelevant in construing a Department of Commerce anti-dumping determination, and
further argue that the Department's "zeroing" methodology-held invalid by both a WTO
Appellate Body and a NAFTA Binational Panel-is not entitled to Chevron deference
because it would bring the United States into noncompliance with treaty obligations.").
170. See Marco Bronckers & Pieter Jan Kuijper, WTO Law in the European Court of
Justice, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1313 (2005) (claiming "it is difficult to point out one
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EC measures in the light of the EC's GATT and WTO obligations.
WTO law tends to be perceived as intergovernmental rules, which
governments and domestic courts may ignore without legal
recourse for their citizens adversely affected by the welfare-

reducing violations of WTO guarantees of market access and rule
of law. 7 ' Both the EC and U.S. governments have requested their
respective domestic courts to refrain from applying WTO rules at
the request of citizens or of NGOs.'72 In order to limit their own
judicial accountability, they have repeatedly encouraged their
respective courts to apply domestic trade regulations without
regard to WTO dispute settlement findings on their illegality.'73
The simultaneous insistence by these same trade politicians that
WTO rules are enforceable at their own request in domestic courts
vis-A-vis violations of WTO law by states inside the EC or inside
the United States,'" illustrates the political, rather than legal
nature of such Machiavellian objections against judicial

specific moment at which it can be established beyond doubt that WTO rules have been
breached, even after a decision of a panel or report of the Appellate Body," and "that it is
rarely or never possible to speak of a sufficiently serious breach of WTO law" by the
political EC institutions justifying the EC's non-contractual liability for damages pursuant
to Article 288 EC Treaty).
171. See, e.g., the criticism by the EC's legal advisor, P.J. Kuiper of the ECJ's
"Kupferberg jurisprudence," on the judicial applicability of the EC's free trade area
agreements at the request of citizens as politically "naive." Id.
172. On the exclusion of "direct applicability" of WTO rules in the EC and U.S. laws
on the implementation of the WTO agreements see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE
GATIT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 19 (Kluwer Law International 1997) (At the
request of the political EC institutions, the EC Court has refrained long since from
reviewing the legality of EC acts in the light of the EC's GATT and WTO obligations; the
Court refers only very rarely to WTO rules and WTO dispute settlement rulings in
support of the ECJ's interpretations of EC law. In the United States, courts are barred by
legislation from challenging the WTO-consistency of U.S. federal measures.).
173. Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is The
Charming Betsy Sinking?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1533-47 (2001). On the controversial
relationship between the "Charming Betsy doctrine" of consistent interpretation and the
"Chevron doctrine" of judicial deference see Arwel Davies, Connecting or
Compartmentalizing the WTO and United States Legal Systems? The Role of the Charming
Betsy Canon, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 117 (2007). The European Court of Justice has a long
history of ignoring GATT and WTO rules at the request of political EC bodies which have
often misinformed the EC Court on the meaning of GATT/WTO rules and dispute
settlement reports (e.g., in Case C-112/80, Durbeck, ECR [1981] 1095, the Commission
misinformed the EC Court on an unpublished GATT dispute settlement finding against
the EC, and the Court relied on this information without verifying the obviously wrong
information submitted to the Court).
174. Davies, supranote 173.
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accountability for violations by trade bureaucracies of the
international rule of law.
Part I argued that the universal recognition of inalienable
human rights requires national and international courts to review
whether-in their judicial settlement of "disputes concerning
treaties, like other international disputes.., in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law'"' 5-human rights and
other principles of justice (like due process of law) justify judicial
application of international guarantees of freedom, nondiscrimination, rule of law and social safeguard measures for the
benefit of citizens.'76 Part II described the citizen-driven, multilevel
judicial protection of the EC, EEA, and ECHR guarantees of
freedoms, fundamental rights and rule of law as models for
decentralizing and transforming intergovernmental rules and
dispute settlement procedures for the benefit of citizens. Part III
suggests that the "Solange-method" of conditional cooperation by
national courts with the ECJ should serve as a model for
"conditional cooperation" among international and national courts
(Part III C) "as long as" it protects the constitutional rights of
citizens (Part III A). The method should also serve as a model for
judicial self-restraint of the ECtHR vis-A-vis alleged violations of
human rights by EC institutions as long as the EC Court protects
the human rights guarantees of the ECHR (Part III B). Part IV
asks whether the judicial function to settle disputes in conformity
with the principles of procedural and substantive justice can assert
democratic legitimacy in international relations, which-beyond
rights-based European integration law-continues to be
dominated by power politics. It is argued that the legitimacy of
judicial cooperation, self-restraint, "judicial competition," and
"judicial dialogue" among courts derive from their protection of
constitutional citizen-based rights as a constitutional precondition
for individual and democratic self-development in a protected
framework of "participatory," "deliberative," and "cosmopolitan
democracy."'. Citizens have reason to support the multilevel,
judicial protection of citizen rights in European law and to
challenge international judges if they perceive themselves as mere

175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 11, at pmbl.
176. Id.

177. Petersmann, Judging Judges,supra note 57, at 17.
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agents of governments and disregard their constitutional
obligations to settle disputes in conformity with human rights. 78'
A. The German ConstitutionalCourt's "Solange-Protection"of
FundamentalRights in the EC's Legal System
Part II recalled how the ECJ, the EFTA Court, and the
ECtHR have-albeit in different ways -interpreted
the
intergovernmental EC, EEA, and ECHR Treaties as objective
legal orders also protecting individual rights of citizens. All three
courts have acknowledged that the human rights goals of
empowering individuals and effectively protecting human rights,
like the objective of international trade agreements to enable
citizens to engage in mutually beneficial trade transactions under
non-discriminatory conditions of competition, call for "dynamic
judicial interpretations" of treaty rules with due regard to the need
for judicial protection of citizen interests in economic markets and
constitutional
democracies.'79
These
citizen-oriented
interpretations of the EC and EEA Agreements were influenced
by the long-standing insistence of the German Constitutional
Court on its constitutional mandate to protect fundamental rights
and constitutional democracy vis-A-vis abuses of EC powers
affecting citizens in Germany." The "Solange jurisprudence" of
the German Constitutional Court, like similar interactions
between other national constitutional courts and the EC Court,"'
contributed to more effective judicial protection of human rights in
Community law:
In its Solange I judgment of 1974, the German
Constitutional Court held that "as long as" the integration
process of the EC does not include a catalogue of
fundamental rights corresponding to that of the German
Basic Law, German courts could, after having requested a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ, also request a ruling from
the German Constitutional Court regarding the
compatibility of EC acts with fundamental rights and the
German Constitution.1 " This judicial insistence on the
178. Id.
179. Mayer, supra note 80, at 296.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 295.
182. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] May 29, 1974, 37
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 271 (F.R.G.).
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higher level of fundamental rights protection in German
constitutional law was instrumental for the ECJ's judicial
protection of human rights as common, yet unwritten,
constitutional guarantees of EC law."'
In view of the emerging human rights protection in EC law,
the German Constitutional Court held in its Solange II
judgment of 1986 that it would no longer exercise its
jurisdiction for reviewing EC legal acts "as long as" the
ECJ continued to generally and effectively protect
fundamental rights against EC measures in ways
comparable to the essential safeguards of German
constitutional law. '1
In its Maastrichtjudgment (Solange III) of 1993, however,
the German Constitutional Court reasserted its jurisdiction
to defend the scope of German constitutional law: EC
measures exceeding the limited EC competences covered
by the German Act ratifying the EU Treaty
("ausbrechende Gemeinschaftsakte") could not be legally
binding and applicable in Germany.
Following GATT and WTO dispute settlement rulings
concerning EC import restrictions of bananas violating
WTO law, and in view of an ECJ judgment upholding these
restrictions without reviewing their WTO inconsistencies,
several German courts requested the Constitutional Court
to declare these EC restrictions as ultra vires (i.e.,
exceeding the EC's limited competences) and as an illegal
restriction on the constitutional freedoms of German
importers.'" The German Constitutional Court, in its
judgment of 2002... (Solange IV), declared the application
inadmissible on the ground that it had not been argued that
the required level of human rights protection in the EC had

183. On the ECJ's judicial protection of human rights since 1969, see SHELTON, supra
note 45.
184. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] Oct. 22, 1986, 73
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 339 (375) (F.R.G.).
[Federal
[BVerfGE]
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
185. Entscheidungen
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 155 (F.R.G.).
186. Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 57, at 18.
[Federal
[BVerfGE]
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
187. Entscheidungen
Constitutional Court] June 7, 2000, 102 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 147 (F.R.G.).
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generally fallen below the minimum level required by the
German Constitution.
In its judgment of 2005 on the German act implementing
the EU Framework Decision (adopted under the third EU
pillar) on the European Arrest Warrant, the Constitutional
Court held that the automatically binding force and mutual
recognition in Germany of arrest orders from other EU
member states were inconsistent with the fundamental
rights guarantees of the German Basic Law. 89' The limited
jurisdiction of the ECJ for third pillar decisions concerning
police and judicial cooperation might have contributed to
this assertion of national constitutional jurisdiction for
safeguarding fundamental rights vis-A-vis EU decisions in
the area of criminal law and their legislative
implementation in Germany.

B. "Horizontal"Cooperationamong the EC Courts, the EFTA
Court, and the ECtHR in ProtectingIndividualRights in the EEA
Judicial cooperation between the EC courts and the EFTA
Court was legally mandated in the EEA Agreement.9

and

facilitated by the fact that the EEA law to be interpreted by the
EC and EFTA courts was largely identical with the EC's common
market rules (notwithstanding the different context of the EC's
common market and the EEA's free trade area). 1 ' The Court of
First Instance (CFI), in its Opel Austria judgment of 1997, held
that Article 10 of the EEA Agreement (corresponding to the free
trade rules in Articles 12, 13, 16 and 17 EC Treaty) had direct
effect in EC law in view of the high degree of integration protected
by the EEA Agreement, whose objectives exceeded those of a
mere free trade agreement and required the contracting parties to
establish a dynamic and homogenous EEA."2 In numerous cases,
EC court judgments referred to the case-law of the EFTA Court,
for example by pointing out "that the principles governing the
liability of an EFTA state for infringement of a directive referred

188. Petersmann, Judging Judges,supra note 57, at 18.
189. Entscheidungen
des
Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE]
[Federal
Constitutional Court] July 18, 2005, 113 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 273 (F.R.G.).
190. Id. at art. 6.
191. Id.
192. Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, 1997 E.C.R. 11-39.
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to in the EEA Agreement were the subject of the EFTA Court's
judgment of 10 December 1998 in Sveinbjbrnsdottir."'93 In its
Ospelt judgment, the ECJ emphasized that "one of the principal
aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide for the fullest possible
realization of the four freedoms within the whole EEA, so that the
internal market established within the European Union is
extended to the EFTA states."'' 4
The case-law of the EFTA Court evolved in close cooperation
with the EC courts, national courts in EFTA countries, and with
due regard to the case-law of the ECtHR. In view of the
intergovernmental structures of the EEA Agreement, the legal
homogeneity obligations in the EEA Agreement (e.g., Article 6
EEA) as well as in the Agreement between the EFTA States on
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of
Justice (e.g., Article 3 SCA) were interpreted only as obligations
de rsultat with regard to the legal protection of market freedoms
and individual rights in EFTA countries.19 Yet, the EFTA Court
effectively promoted "quasi-direct effect" and "quasi-primacy" as
well as full state liability and protection of individual rights of
market participants in national courts in all EEA countries.' 6 In
various judgments, the EFTA Court followed the ECJ case-law by
interpreting EEA law in conformity with the human rights
guarantees of the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR.'97 In its
Asgeirsson judgment,'98 the EFTA Court rejected the argument
that the reference to the EFTA Court had unduly prolonged the
national court. proceeding in violation of the right to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time (Article 6 ECHR).'
Referring to a judgment by the ECtHR in a case concerning a
delay of two years and seven months due to a reference by a
national court to the ECJ (pursuant to Article 234 EC), the EFTA
Court shared the reasoning of the ECtHR that adding the period

193. Case C-140/97, Rechberger v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3499 39.
194. Case C-452/01, Ospelt, 2003 E.C.R. 1-9743 29.
195. Baudenbacher, supra note 157.
196. Id. ("Direct effect of primary law, state liability and the duty of the courts to
interpret national law in the light of EEA obligations have been clearly and firmly
accepted in national law by Norwegian courts.").
197. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 45, at arts. 6, 10.
198. Case E-2/03, kaeruvaldio v. Asgeir Logi Asgeirsson, Axel P6tur Asgeirsson and
Helgi MAr Reynisson, 2003 Rep. EFTA Ct. 185.
199. Id,
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of preliminary references (which was less than six months in the
case before the EFTA Court) could undermine the legitimate
functions of such cooperation among national and international
courts in their joint protection of the rule of law. °°
The ECtHR has frequently referred in its judgments to
provisions of EU law and to judgments of the ECJ. In Goodwin,
for example, the ECtHR referred to Article 9 of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (right to marry) to back up its judgment
that the refusal to recognize a change of sex for the purposes of
2 ° In
marriage constituted a violation of Article 12 ECHR.
Dangeville, the ECtHR considered the fact that French measures
were incompatible with EC law when it determined that an
interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions was not required.2 2 In the series of cases, Waite and
Kennedy v. Germany, the ECtHR held that it would be
incompatible with the purpose and objective of the ECHR if an
attribution of tasks to an international organization or in the
context of international agreements could absolve the contracting
2 ° In the Bosphorus
states of their obligations under the ECHR.
case, the ECtHR had to examine the consistency of Ireland's
impounding of a Yugoslavian aircraft on the legal basis of EC
regulations imposing sanctions against the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia;' the ECtHR referred to the ECJ case-law
according to which respect for fundamental rights is a condition of
the lawfulness of EC acts, as well as to the ECJ preliminary ruling
that "the impoundment of the aircraft did not give rise to a
° In its examination of
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.''2"

whether compliance with EC obligations could justify the
impugned interference by Ireland with the applicant's property
rights, the ECtHR proceeded on the basis of the following four
principles:
(a) A Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of
the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs
regardless of whether the act or omission in question was
200. Id.
201. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 447,
58, 100.
202. SA Dangeville v. France, App. No. 36677/97, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R.
203. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 67
(Feb. 18, 1999).
204. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2005-VI Eur.Ct. H.R. 109.
205. Id. 167.
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a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to
comply with international legal obligations. 6
(b) State action taken in compliance with such legal
obligations is justified as long as the relevant organization
is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards
both the substantive guarantees offered and the
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner
which can be considered at least
-7 equivalent to that for
which the Convention provides.

0

(c) If such equivalent protection is considered to be
provided by the organization, the presumption will be that
a State has not departed from the requirements of the
Convention when it does no more than implement legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the
organization ."0

(d) However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that
the protection of Convention rights was manifestly
deficient. In such cases, the interest of international
cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's
role as a "constitutional instrument of European public
order" in the field of human rights."°
After examining the comprehensive EC guarantees of
fundamental rights and judicial remedies, the ECtHR found "that
the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be considered
to be, and to have been at the relevant time, 'equivalent' ... to

that of the Convention system. Consequently, the presumption
arises that Ireland did not depart from requirements of the
Convention when it implemented legal obligations flowing from its
membership of the EC."2 "° As the Court did not find any "manifest
deficiency" in the protection of the applicant's Convention rights,
the relevant presumption of compliance with the ECHR had not
been rebutted. '

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. 153.
Id. 1 155.
Id. 156.
Id.
Id. IT 165, 166.
Id.
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C. Towards a "Solange-Method" of Cooperationamong
InternationalTrade and Environmental Courts Beyond Europe
Competing multilateral treaty and dispute settlement systems
with "forum selection clauses" enabling governments to submit
disputes to competing jurisdictions (with the risk of conflicting
judgments) continue to multiply outside of economic law and
human rights law. For example, multiplication has been seen in
international environmental law, maritime law, criminal law, and
other areas of international law.212 Proposals to coordinate such
overlapping jurisdictions through hierarchical procedures (e.g.,
preliminary rulings or advisory opinions by the ICJ) are opposed
by most governments."' Agreement on exclusive jurisdiction
clauses (as in Article 292 EC Treaty, Article 23 Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU)/WTO, Article 282 Law of the Sea
Convention) may not prevent submission of disputes involving
several treaty regimes to competing dispute settlement fora.2 1' For
example, in the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom
over radioactive pollution from the MOX plant in Sellafield (UK),
four dispute settlement bodies were seized and all of them used
diverging methods for coordinating their respective jurisdictions. 1'
1. The OSPAR Arbitral Award of 2003 on the MOX Plant
Dispute
In order to clarify the obligations of the United Kingdom to
make available all information "on the state of the maritime area,
on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it 21'
pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR),
Ireland and the United Kingdom agreed to establish an arbitral
tribunal under the OSPAR Convention. 7 Even though Article
32(5)(a) of the OSPAR Convention requires the tribunal to decide
according to "the rules of international law, and in particular those

212. Petersmann, 'ConstitutionalJustice',supranote 66, at 787.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Yuval Shany, The First MOX Plant Award: The Need to Harmonize Competing
Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 816
(2004).
216. Id. at 819.
217. Id.
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of the Convention,8 the tribunal's award of July 2003 was based

only on the OSPAR Convention, without taking into account
relevant environmental regulations of the EC and of the 1998
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (ratified by all EC member states as well as by the EC)."9
The OSPAR arbitral tribunal decided in favor of the United
Kingdom that the latter had not violated its treaty obligations by
not disclosing the information sought by Ireland."'
2. The UNCLOS 2001 Provisional Measures and 2003 Arbitral
Decision in the MOX Plant Dispute
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) offers
parties the choice (in Articles 281) of submitting disputes to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ,
arbitral tribunals, or other dispute settlement fora established by
regional or bilateral treaties."' As Ireland claimed that the
discharges released by the MOX Plant contaminated Irish waters
in violation of UNCLOS, it requested establishment of an arbitral
interim
tribunal and-pending this procedure -requested
protection measures from the ITLOS pursuant to Article 290
UNCLOSY. The ITLOS order of December 2001, after
determining the prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral
tribunal to decide the merits of the dispute, requested both parties
to cooperate and consult regarding the emissions from the MOX
Plant into the Irish Sea, pending the decision on the merits by the
arbitral tribunal.22 3 The arbitral tribunal suspended its proceedings

in June 2003 and requested the parties to clarify whether, as
claimed by the United Kingdom, the EC Court had jurisdiction to
decide this dispute on the basis of the relevant EC and
EURATOM rules, including UNCLOS as an integral part of the
Community legal system.

218. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, 1992 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 703, 31 ILM 1312 (1993) art. 32(5)(a).
219. Shany, supra note 215 at 820.
220. T. McDorman, Access to Information under Article 9 OSPAR Convention
(Ireland v. UK), FinalAward, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 330 (2004).

221. Petersmann, 'ConstitutionalJustice', supra note 66, at 788.
222. Shany, supra note 215, at 818.
223.

Id.

224. Id.

408

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:367

3. The EC Court Judgment of May 2006 in the MOX Plant
Dispute
In October 2003, the EU Commission started an infringement
proceeding against Ireland on the ground that-as the EC had
ratified and transformed UNCLOS into an integral part of the EC
legal system-Ireland's submission of the dispute to tribunals
outside the Community legal order had violated the exclusive
jurisdiction of the EC Court under Article 292 EC and Article 193
of the EURATOM Treaty." In its judgment of May 2006, the
Court confirmed its exclusive jurisdiction on the ground that the
UNCLOS provisions on the prevention of marine pollution relied
on by Ireland in its dispute relating to the MOX Plant "are rules
' The Court
which form part of the Community legal order." 26
followed from the autonomy of the Community legal system and
Article 282 UNCLOS that the system for the resolution of disputes
set out in the EC Treaty must, in principle, take precedence over
that provided for in Part XV of UNCLOS 7 As the dispute
concerned the interpretation and application of EC law within the
terms of Article 292 EC, "Articles 220 EC and 292 EC precluded
Ireland from initiating proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal
with a view to resolving the dispute concerning the MOX plant."28
By requesting the arbitral tribunal to decide disputes concerning
the interpretation and application of Community law, Ireland had
violated the exclusive jurisdiction of .the Court under Article 292
EC as well as the EC member states' duties of close cooperation,
prior information, and loyal consultation of the competent
Community institutions as prescribed in Article 10 EC."9
4. The 2004 Ilzeren Rijn Arbitration between the Netherlands and
Belgium
The izeren Rijn arbitration under the auspices of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration concerned a dispute between
Belgium and the Netherlands over Belgium's right to the use and
reopening of an old railway line leading through a protected

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Case C-459/03, European Commission v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-04635, J 121.
Id.
Id. 133.
Id.
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natural habitat and payment of the costs involved. 2 ' The arbitral
tribunal was requested to settle the dispute on the basis of
international law, including, if necessary, EC law, with due respect
to the obligations of the EC member states under Article 292
EC.23' The Tribunal agreed with the view shared by both parties
that there was no dispute within the meaning of Article 292 EC
because its decision on the apportionment of costs did not require
any interpretation of EC law (e.g.,
232 the Council Directive on the
conservation of natural habitats).
5. The "Solange-Method" as Reciprocal Respect for
Constitutional Justice
The above-mentioned examples for competing jurisdictions
on the settlement of environmental disputes among European
states raise questions similar to those regarding overlapping
jurisdictions for the settlement of trade disputes, human rights
disputes, or criminal proceedings in national and international
criminal courts. The UNCLOS provisions for dispute settlement
on the basis of "this Convention and other rules of international
law not incompatible with this Convention" (Article 288)
prompted the ITLOS to affirm prima facie jurisdiction in the
MOX Plant dispute. 3 The Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal argued
convincingly, however, that the prospect of resolving this dispute
in the EC Court on the basis of EC law risked leading to
conflicting decisions which, bearing in mind considerations of
mutual respect and comity between judicial institutions and the
explicit recognition of mutually agreed regional jurisdictions in
Article 282 UNCLOS, justified suspending the arbitral proceeding
and enjoining the parties to resolve the Community law issues in
the institutional framework of the EC. 234 WTO law recognizes
similar rights of WTO members to conclude regional trade
agreements with autonomous dispute settlement procedures; yet
the lack of a WTO provision corresponding to Article 282
UNCLOS, and the WTO rights to the quasi automatic
230. Nikolaos Lavranos, The MOX Plantand IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court is the
Supreme Arbiter?, 19 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 223 (2006) [hereinafter Lavranos, The MOX
Plant].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Shany, supra note 215, at 826.
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establishment of WTO dispute settlement panels require that
WTO dispute settlement bodies respect the right of WTO
members to receive a WTO dispute settlement ruling on the WTO
obligations of members of FTAs, even if the respondent WTO
member would prefer to settle the dispute in the framework of
FTA procedures.235 The EC Court's persistent refusal to decide
disputes on the basis of the WTO obligations of the EC and its
member states, offers an additional argument for WTO dispute
settlement bodies to respect the rights of WTO members
(including EC member states) to WTO dispute settlement rulings
on alleged violations of WTO rights and obligations (e.g., by the
EC Council's import restrictions on bananas), notwithstanding the
exclusive (but ineffective) ECJ jurisdiction for settling disputes
inside the EC over WTO law: "As long as" the EC Court
continues to ignore the WTO obligations of the EC in its dispute
settlement practices and offers EC member states no judicial
remedy against EC majority decisions violating WTO law, WTO
dispute settlement bodies may see no reason to exercise judicial
self-restraint in WTO disputes over alleged violations by the EC of
its WTO obligations vis-A-vis EC member states.23 This lack of a
treaty provision similar to Article 282 UNCLOS might also have
prompted the OSPAR arbitral tribunal to decide on the claim of
an alleged violation of the OSPAR Convention, without any
discussion of Article 292 EC and without prejudice to future
dispute settlement proceedings in the EC Court based on EC law
(which, arguably, includes more comprehensive information
disclosure requirements).237 The Ijzeren Rijn arbitral tribunal

235. Nikolaos. Lavranos, Towards a Solange-Method between InternationalCourts and
Tribunals?,in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 217

(Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) [hereinafter Lavranos, Solange-Method].
236. Such challenges in the WTO by EC member states of EC acts violating WTO law
have never occurred so far. Most Community lawyers argue that not only from the point
of view of Community law, but also "from the point of view of international law, the
supremacy of Community law within the EC and its member states must be accepted."
Lavranos, The MOX Plant, supra note 230, at 233. Yet, it is arguable even from the point
of view of Community law that the duty of loyalty (Article 10 EC) applies "as long as" the
ECJ offers effective judicial remedies against obvious violations by EC institutions of their
obligations (e.g., under Articles 220, 300 EC) to respect the rule of law and protect EC
member states from international legal responsibility for EC majority decisions violating
mixed agreements.
237. Lavranos, The MOX Plant,supra note 230, at 238.
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examined the legal relevance of Article 292 EC and decided the
dispute without prejudice to EC law.2"
This "Solange-principle," that is, conditioning respect for
competing jurisdictions on respect of constitutional principles of
human rights and rule of law, has also been applied by the EC
Court itself. For instance, in its Opinion 1/91 on the inconsistency
of the EEA Draft Agreement with EC law, the EC Court found
that the EEA provisions for the establishment of an EEA Court
were inconsistent with the "autonomy of the Community legal
order" and the "exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice" (e.g.,
in so far as the EEA provisions did not guarantee legally binding
effects of "advisory opinions" by the EEA Court on national
courts in EEA member states). 39 The "Solange-principle" also
2 as well as the
explains the jurisprudence of both the EC Court 40
EFTA Court that private arbitral tribunals are not recognized as
courts or tribunals of member states (within the meaning of
Article 234 EC and Article 33 SCA) entitled to request
preliminary rulings by the European courts: As international
arbitral tribunals (like the OSPAR and UIzeren Rijn arbitral
tribunals mentioned above) are likewise not entitled to request
preliminary rulings from the European courts, they might exercise
judicial self-restraint and defer to the competing jurisdiction of
European courts in disputes requiring interpretation and
application of European law. To the extent conflicts of jurisdiction
and conflicting judgments cannot be prevented by means of
exclusive jurisdictions and hierarchical rules, 42 international courts
should follow the example of national civil and commercial courts
and European courts by resolving conflicts through judicial
cooperation and "judicial dialogues" based on principles of judicial
comity and judicial protection of constitutional principles (like due
process of law, res judicata, and human rights) underlying modern
international law. The horizontal cooperation among national and
international courts with overlapping jurisdictions for the
protection of constitutional rights in Europe reflects the

238. Id.
239. Opinion 1/91, supra note 143.
240. Case C-125/04, Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique
Voyages et Culture SA, 2005 E.C.R. 1-923.
241. Id.
242. Lavranos, The MOX Plant, supra note 230, at 242 (the key to all solutions is
hierarchy).
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constitutional duty of judges to protect "constitutional justice" and
should serve as a model for similar cooperation among national
and international courts with overlapping jurisdictions in other
fields of international law,"3 such as the settlement of trade and
environmental disputes among the 153 WTO members. Especially
in the areas of intergovernmental regulation where states remain
reluctant to submit to review by international courts (e.g., as in the
second and third pillars of the EU Treaty), national courts must
remain vigilant guardians so as to protect citizens and their
constitutional rights from inadequate judicial remedies at the
international level of multilevel governance.
6. Judicial Self-Restraint in WTO Dispute Settlement Practices
The WTO dispute settlement system differs from all other
international dispute settlement systems by its uniquely
institutionalized review and adoption of all WTO panel, appellate,
and arbitral reports by WTO members in the Dispute- Settlement
Body (DSB). Notably, in the field of trade-related environmental
measures, WTO dispute settlement reports and the DSB have
referred to the WTO objectives of "sustainable development"
(WTO Preamble) and to multilateral environmental agreements
for justifying differential treatment (e.g., imports of shrimps
dependent upon whether their harvesting methods protected sea
turtles) on grounds of environmental protection.'" Yet, the WTO
Panel Report on the EC's restrictions on genetically modified
organisms interpreted Article 31(3)(c) VCLT narrowly, as
applying only to international law rules binding all parties of the
treaty concerned. 5 This narrow interpretation of the customary
rules of treaty interpretation was supported by WTO Members as
protecting state sovereignty and limiting the relevant context of
WTO rules (there are hardly any other multilateral treaties ratified
by all 153 WTO members, including customs territories like Hong
243. Lavranos, Solange-Method, supra note 235, at 235 ("[flf the Solange-method
would be applied by all international courts and tribunals in case of jurisdictional overlap,
the risk of diverging or conflicting judgments could be effectively minimized thus reducing
the danger of a fragmentation of the international(including European) legal order....
[O]ne could argue that the Solange-method and for that matter judicial comity in general
is part of the legal duty of each and every court to deliver justice.").
244. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products,W'T/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (adoptedNov. 6, 1998).
245. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products,supra note 17, T 7.65.
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Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the EC). In the Mexico-Soft Drinks
dispute, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body declined jurisdiction
for claims based on NAFTA and interpreted the general exception
in Article XX(d) GATT narrowly, as not covering ."laws and
regulations" which Mexico had adopted as countermeasures in
order to respond to alleged violations of NAFTA obligations by
the United States."6 According to the Appellate Body, NAFTA
obligations are not "laws and regulations" within the meaning of
Article XX(d) GATT because they are not part of the domestic
legal order."7 The reasoning by the Appellate Body-that "it
would have to assess whether the relevant international agreement
had been violated" in order to examine the applicability of Article
XX(d), and that "this is not the function of panels and the
Appellate Body as intended by the DSU" 2 4 -would presumably
lead to similar judicial self-restraint in the Swordfish dispute
between the EC and Chile in the WTO: 9
WTO dispute
settlement bodies would refrain from examining the Chilean claim
that Chile's violations of GATT obligations were justified
countermeasures in response to preceding violations by the EC of
environmental obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention."0
Even if-as permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention (Article
280) as well as by the DSU (e.g., Articles 7, 26)-Chile, the EC,
and the DSB would request a WTO panel to examine the dispute
in the light of both WTO law and the Law of the Sea Convention,
the narrow interpretation of GATT Article XX is likely to prevail
(i.e., that GATT Article XX does not justify unilateral departures
from GATT obligations in response to violations of non-WTO
agreements) .'

246. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, supra note 165. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel finding that Mexico's
measures, which sought to secure compliance by the United States with its obligations
under the NAFrA, did not constitute measures "to secure compliance with laws or
regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) GAT'.
247.

Id. [56.

248. Id. 69.
249. Chile-Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, Request for
Consultations by the European Communities WT[DS193/1 (Apr. 26, 2000) (the WTO
complaint by the EC and the related Chilean complaint against the EC in the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, were suspended).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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Is JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF "CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE"
LEGITIMATE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW?

The universal recognition of jus cogens and of inalienable
human rights; the "treaty constitutions" of international
organizations with rule-making, executive, and judicial powers; the
proliferation of international courts; their judicial protection of
rule of law; and the judicial clarification of "constitutional
principles" limiting abuses of public and private power, transform
some of the intergovernmental structures of international law
(notably in Europe) by constitutional "checks and balances" as
well as through procedural and substantive "constitutional
restraints." 252 In most of the forty-seven European states
cooperating in the Council of Europe, human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and mutually beneficial cooperation of citizens across
national frontiers are now legally and judicially protected by
national and European constitutional law. 3 As explained in Parts I
and II, the constitutional obligation of independent and impartial
judges to protect constitutional rights, and the multilevel
cooperation of judges in protecting "constitutional justice" and
mutually beneficial cooperation among citizens across national
frontiers in Europe, were major driving forces behind this
"constitutionalization" of transnational economic and civil society
relations in Europe. Disputes among European states have
become rare not only in the EC Court, the EIFTA Court, and in
the ECtHR; they are also decreasing in worldwide courts (e.g., the
ICJ) and in other dispute settlement bodies (e.g., the WTO).
A. How to Correct "DiscourseFailures"in Intergovernmental
Politics?
Realists and public choice analyses emphasize that the
"rational ignorance" of most voters vis-A-vis global public goods,
"interest group capture" of foreign policies, and the introverted
"pathologies" of democratic processes, make it difficult for
periodically elected, national politicians to engage in cosmopolitan
action unsupported by the people:
"Information and power
asymmetries, as well as the absence of a centralized enforcement
mechanism, make international collective action problems difficult
to overcome even when there is a plausible argument that the
252. Petersmann, Judging Judges, supra note 57, at 26.
253. Id.
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international regime, if successful, would enhance the welfare of
every participating state. 254 The "protection biases" of national
foreign policies in favor of protecting powerful local constituents
(e.g., import-competing industries financing election campaigns)
and the public's ignorance are rational (e.g., in view of the high
information costs) and reveal structural "discourse failures.""
Hence, it is no coincidence that the power-oriented,
intergovernmental reasoning among European states was
progressively "constitutionalized" by multilevel judicial reasoning
of independent national and European courts, usually at the
request of independent European community institutions (like the
EC Commission and the European Commission for Human
Rights) and private and public litigants. Support by civil society
(e.g., the EC's "market citizens") and by multilevel parliamentary
cooperation (e.g., in the EC and Council of Europe) also helped to
clarify the self-interests of states in European integration."6
Many other examples-like European citizenship, the legal
autonomy of EC institutions and European courts, the ever closer
networks of independent regulatory agencies and other multilevel
governance institutions in Europe, and the rare recourse to the
"horizontal" enforcement mechanisms of international law (such
as inter-state sanctions)
in relations among European
democracies -confirm that "state sovereignty" is "disaggregating"
in Europe.257 In contrast to North American proponents of "global
administrative law" who accept intergovernmental structures as
given, Europeans have learned to support the need for a
transnational "empowering constitution" protecting citizen rights
across frontiers (e.g., the EC's "market freedoms"), as well as a
"limiting constitution" constraining protectionist abuses of
legislative powers in transnational relations.
B. Multilevel Governance for the Collective Supply of International
Public Goods Requires Multilevel JudicialProtectionof Rule of
Law
All states have experienced and learned that effective
protection of human rights, constitutional democracy, and an
254. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 219.
255. GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO TESON, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE (2006).
256. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGTHER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).

257. More generally on "disaggregated sovereignty" see id. at 266.
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efficient division of labor, are not possible without rule of law. This
is true also for the ever expanding multilevel governance for the
collective supply of international public goods. The success of the
"solange-method" of judicial cooperation and contestation among
European courts based on respect for "constitutional pluralism,"
has led to judicial clarification and legal protection of an ever
growing number of common constitutional principles limiting
abuses in European economic, environmental, and human rights
law for the benefit of citizens."' The limited role of European
courts in the second and third "pillars" of the European Union,
and the limited cooperation among European and worldwide
courts (e.g., the ICJ and the WTO's Appellate Body), illustrate the
political limits of international courts in Europe and more notably
in areas of national security and foreign policy disputes over the
distribution of power or the legitimacy of international law rules.259
Beyond Europe, international relations remain dominated by
power politics; refusal by most UN member states to submit to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, insistence on state sovereignty,
and introverted "constitutional nationalism" impeding collective
supply of global public goods. "6 Proposals for extending European
"multilevel constitutionalism" to worldwide organizations (such as
the UN and the WTO) are opposed by most states outside Europe
(including the United States) in view of their focus on
constitutional and democratic nationalism and power-oriented
foreign policies.26' The more intergovernmental networks and
worldwide organizations evade parliamentary and democratic
control, and the more legislators fail to correct the ubiquitous
"market failures" and "governance failures" in international
relations, the more citizens have reason to appeal to the "public
reasoning" of independent and impartial courts mandated to

258. See Petersmann, JudgingJudges, supra note 57, at 26.
259. Id.

260. On this "globalization paradox" (i.e., needing multilevel governance for the
collective supply of international pubic goods, but fearing and opposing such governance)
see id. at 8. On the need for "multilevel constitutionalism" as a necessary legal framework
for the collective, democratic supply of international public goods see STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
LAW,
CONSTITUTIONALISM,
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 5-57 (Christian

Petersmann eds., 2006).
261.

Id.
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protect constitutional rights and rule of law "in conformity with
principles of justice. 262
Even though the reality of international politics continues to
evade effective worldwide constitutional constraints, the multilevel
democratic governance needed for international protection of
human rights and of other international public goods requires
multilevel constitutionalism. If democratic and judicial institutions
are perceived as instruments for protecting the constitutional
rights of citizens without which individual and democratic selfdevelopment in dignity are not sustainable (e.g., due to public and
private abuses of power, including majoritarian abuses of
parliamentary powers), then multilevel judicial protection of
fundamental freedoms of citizens can be justified as a necessary
precondition for constitutional democracy in a globally integrated
world. The risk of paternalist abuses of judicial powers must be
countered by "deliberative democracy" and "public reasoning."
Rights-based "judicial discourses" focusing on "principles of
justice" tend to be more precise and more rational than political'
promises to protect vaguely defined "public interests." Similar to
European courts, national constitutional judges and economic
courts outside Europe increasingly argue that constitutional
democracies are premised on "active liberty"; hence, the exercise
of rights to individual and democratic self-government (in citizendriven "political markets" no less than in consumer-driven
economic markets) may serve as a "source of judicial authority
and an interpretative aid to more effective protection of ancient
and modern liberty alike."263 Legitimacy no longer derives from
(inter)governmen.tal fiat, but from democratic and judicial
justification of relevant rules as "just."" The independence,
impartiality, and constitutional function of judges to protect
constitutional rights against abuses of power legitimize
adjudication as a necessary component of constitutional
democracy.265 Citizens must hold governments and courts more
accountable for meeting their constitutional obligation to protect
262. Id.
263. S.G.
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interpretations of international law rules in conformity with the
human rights and constitutional rights of citizens. The increasing
cross-references in ECJ and EFTA judgments to their respective
case-law, as well as to other European and international courts
(e.g., the ECtHR, WTO dispute settlement rulings, and the ICJ),
may also serve as models for cooperation among other
international courts in order to better coordinate their respective
jurisprudence on the basis of common legal principles."
Civil society and its democratic representatives rightly
challenge traditional conceptions of international justice shielding
an authoritarian "international law among states" as being
inconsistent with the universal recognition of inalienable human
rights, which call for constitutional conceptions of justice as a
shield of the individual and of human rights against abuses of
power. As long as citizen-oriented "world constitutionalism" for
the collective supply of "global public goods" remains a utopia,
legal and judicial protection of constitutional rights in
transnational relations in conformity with principles of justice and
international
law
remain
essential
for
"bottom-up
constitutionalization" of international legal practices through
pragmatic piecemeal reforms. Just as multilevel constitutionalism
in Europe was rendered possible by the intergovernmental
creation and judicial protection of common markets and of rightsbased, transnational communities (rather than by "Wilsonian
liberalism" projecting national, democratic institutions to the
worldwide level), so will the needed "constitutionalization" of
intergovernmental power politics and "cosmopolitan peace"
crucially depend on the wisdom and courage of judges supporting
citizen-oriented reforms of international economic law and judicial
protection of constitutional rights in the peaceful cooperation
among citizens across national frontiers.

266. Allan Rosas, With a Little Help from My Friends: International Case-Law as a
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JURISPRUDENCE 201 (2006).

